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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that ¯ring decisions of ¯rms can help ex-
plain the shape of the wage distribution. To emphasize this result, we
consider a matching model with both idiosyncratic productivity shocks
that hit jobs and heterogeneity of workers according to ex ante unob-
servable abilities. Computation experiments show that the model can
generate a hump-shaped wage distribution despite assuming a uniform
distribution of shocks and a Pareto distribution of abilities.
1 Introduction
The theory of equilibrium unemployment with matching and endogenous job
destructions (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) has become an extensively-
used framework both to address empirical facts of the labor market dynamics
and to provide important insights into the design of the labor market policy.
Despite recent debates about the empirical relevance of the Nash-bargaining
of wages (see Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005a)), this framework undoubtedly
helps in explaining stylized facts characterizing labor market °ows (Cole
and Rogerson (1999)), unemployment dynamics (Pissarides (2009)) and real
business cycle features (Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995) or Ch¶ eron and Lan-
got (2004)). This framework is also well-suited to show how employment
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1protection, hiring subsidies or labor taxes can be used to improve welfare
(see among many others Millard (1996), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999),
Pissarides (2000) or more recently Ch¶ eron, Hairault and Langot (2008b)).
From the end of the 90s, another strand of the search-matching literature
has focused on wage dispersion considering on-the-job search rather than en-
dogenous ¯ring decisions. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) stressed the role
of search frictions within an on-the-job search background to generate wage
dispersion despite homogenous workers and ¯rms. Subsequent works by Bon-
temps, Robin and van der Berg (1999), Bontemps, Robin and van der Berg
(2000), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) or Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2006) mainly emphasized the e®ect of market frictions in combination with
heterogenous productivities of both jobs and workers' abilities, as a way to ¯t
the distribution of wages. The goal of our paper is to point out that lessons
can be learnt from endogenous job destruction decisions to understand wage
dispersion as well.
The starting point of our contribution is also an empirical one. An in-
vestigation into the French Labor Force survey (Enqu^ ete Emploi) shows not
only a log-normal aggregate distribution of wages but also a strongly neg-
ative correlation between the employment to unemployment transition rate
and the wage interval workers belong to (¯gure 1)1. Figure 2 shows the
same statistics by skill groups. Of course, there are strong di®erences both
in earnings and in employment exit rates according to skill level. But the
log-normal property of the wage distribution is robust. This is also roughly
true for the decreasing shape of the employment exit rate with wages, except
for high-skilled workers for whom we do not observe any signi¯cant trend
(neither negative nor positive). More precisely, considering wages below the
5th decile, a signi¯cant negative slope can be found for unskilled, low-skilled
and medium-skilled workers. Above the median wage, this slope is virtually
zero for these groups.
This paper aims at showing that a model which generates this nega-
tive correlation produces new insights to understand the shape of the wage
distribution. We consider a job creation-job destruction model in line with
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) extended to account for heterogenous work-
ers. So, there are both kinds of heterogeneity into the model: (i) each ¯rm-job
pair is hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks, (ii) each worker di®ers ac-
1Detailed description of the data set and computed statistics could be found in ap-
pendix. For now, merely note that we consider nine deciles and therefore ten wage inter-
vals. We compute the average transition rate from employment to unemployment within
each interval.
2Figure 1: Wage dispersion and employment to unemployment transition rates
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3Figure 2: Wage dispersion and employment to unemployment transition rates
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4cording to its ability. As the latter is assumed to be ex ante unobservable by
¯rms, we consider non-directed search.2 Quantitative model properties are
then compared with statistics computed within skill group. In particular, our
computation experiments reveal that the model can generate a decreasing re-
lation between the job destruction rate and the wage decile, which in turn
implies consistent model properties with an hump-shaped wage distribution.
Interestingly, this outcome is obtained despite the uniform distribution of
productivity shocks usually assumed and the Pareto distribution of workers'
abilities.
Two arguments the model contribute to yield a hump-shaped wage dis-
tribution in spite of the Pareto distribution of abilities:
² As low-ability workers (who earn on average low wages) face higher exit
rates, their proportion in the employed population is reduced.
² As ¯rms agree to keep high-ability workers hit by bad shocks, the share
of middle-wage workers is increased.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. A ¯rst section presents
the framework. A second one deals with computation experiments. The last
section concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Assumptions and labor market °ows
We consider a continuous-time matching model at steady state with endoge-
nous job creations and destructions. Workers are heterogenous due to unob-
servable ability a among the interval [a;a], with F(a) the exogenous cumula-
tive distribution function of abilities. When a ¯rm opens a job vacancy she
knows the distribution function of abilities but does not ex ante observe the
ability of the contacted worker. This ability is revealed once the worker has
been hired.
Each ¯rm has one job. The productivity of the job/¯rm depends not
only on the ability of the worked hired, but also on a random component
2It is obvious that the introduction of workers heterogeneity in a matching model
with non-directed search raises also some (in)e±ciency issues, i.e. the Hosios condition no
longer achieves e±ciency. Such theoretical issues have been examined by Shimer and Smith
(2001), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Blaµ zquez and Jansen (2008) or Ch¶ eron, Hairault and
Langot (2008a) for instance. Yet, as our model does not add any new interesting insights
about that point, and because our focus is above all empirical, e±ciency issues are beyond
the scope of this paper.
5which is job speci¯c. We denote " the ¯rm's productivity shock which occurs
at Poisson rate ¸, and where the cdf is G("); 8 " 2 [0;1]. The overall
productivity of the job is then given by " + a.3
A job destruction then arises when the random component falls below
an endogenous threshold which depends on worker's ability. We denote this
threshold R(a) so that the job destruction rate is given by ¸G(R(a)).
Assuming that ¯rms cannot ex ante direct their search according to (un-
observable) workers' ability, an aggregate matching function M(v;u) gives
the number of hirings, where v and u respectively denote the number of va-
cancies and unemployed workers.4 Accordingly, contact rate for each worker
is given by µq(µ) ´
M(v;u)
u , where q(µ) ´
M(v;u)
v , and µ ´ v
u denotes the la-
bor market tightness. In addition, we consider that at the time of opening
a job vacancy, ie. before worker and ¯rm meet, the random component of
productivity is not known. In our framework, this implies that R(a) also
gives the threshold productivity value for job creation5, and the transition
rate from unemployment to employment for a worker with ability a is given
by µq(µ)[1 ¡ G(R(a))].
Lastly, denoting u(a) the number of unemployed workers with ability a
and de¯ning f(a) ´ F 0(a), equilibrium labor market °ows at steady state
imply:
u(a)µq(µ) = ¸G(R(a))[f(a) ¡ u(a)] 8a 2 [a;a]
The overall unemployment rate is then given by u =
R ¹ a
a u(a)da.
2.2 Hiring and ¯ring behaviors
The recruiting policy is determined by the expected average value of the
job once ¯lled. But as ¯rms cannot ex ante target hirings among heteroge-
nous workers, it depends on productivity draws, hence on the distribution of
idiosyncratic shocks.
The value of a vacancy is therefore de¯ned as follows:








[J(a;") ¡ V ]dG(")
¾
da
with r the interest rate, c ¸ 0 the °ow cost of recruiting a worker and where
the value of a ¯lled job is given by:
3Note that this technology of production implies that the size of the shock does not
depend on the ex post worker's ability.
4It is increasing and concave in both arguments.
5This is due to the fact that we do not consider neither hiring nor ¯ring costs.




where w(a;") stands for the wage.
A standard free entry condition then determines the labor market tight-














Job destruction occurs if the value of the job turns out to be negative,
J(a;") · 0. The job destruction policy rule can therefore be characterized
by a threshold value for productivity, R(a) satisfying J(a;R(a)) = 0. Since
we do not consider any hiring nor ¯ring cost, this threshold also gives the
minimum value for productivity from which a match is formed. This leads
to:




On one hand, the higher the wage, the higher the reservation productivity
R(a), hence the higher (lower) the job destructions (creations). On the other
hand, the higher the option value of ¯lled jobs (expected gains in the future),
the weaker the job destructions and the greater the job creations.
2.3 The wage setting
We consider the conventional Nash-bargaining of wages assumption.6 Firms
and workers share the global surplus generated by a job according to their
respective bargaining power. Let's denote this surplus S(a;") = J(a;") +
W(a;") ¡ U(a), with the worker's value of unemployment and employment
6Since Shimer (2005a) and Hall and Milgrom (2008) this is somewhat a disputed as-
sumption, at least from an empirical perspective. Hall and Milgrom (2008) point out
that rigidity of wages helps to explain the observed volatility of unemployment over the
business cycle. Nevertheless, Pissarides (2009) recently rehabilitates the Nash-bargaining
showing that the failure of the Mortensen-Pissarides' framework rather relies on the size
of labor turnover costs typically understated.
7are respectively given by:







rW(a;") = w(a;") + ¸
Z 1
R(a)
W(a;x)dG(x) + ¸G(R(a))U(a) ¡ ¸W(a;")
The Nash-sharing rule writes:
W(a;") ¡ U(a) = °S(a;")
where ° stands for the bargaining power of workers. It is then straightforward
to derive the following expression for the wage:













wage expression can be rewritten as:7
w(a;") = ° [a + " + cµ¿(a)] + (1 ¡ °)z
Despite the assumption of non-directed search, the way search costs enters
the wage equation is ability speci¯c, through the variable ¿(a). The latter
gives the ex post value for a job ¯lled by a worker with ability a, relative
to the ex ante expected average value of job creation de¯ned over the pool
of unemployed workers likely to be hired. Workers with the highest abilities
are characterized by ¿(a) > 1, which contributes together with productivity
a to increase their wage. High-ability workers are then rewarded for more
than the saving of the average search costs (cµ). Conversely, workers with
low abilities also earn low wages due to lower imputed value of search costs.8
7Such a wage expression has been formerly proposed by Ch¶ eron A., Hairault J.-O. and
Langot F. (2008a) who consider age-di®erentiated workers.
8Depending on productivity draws, wage earnings can increase or decrease at each
period. In France, around 40% of workers experience of fall in their real wages from one
year to another.
82.4 Equilibrium de¯nition
At this stage, we can de¯ne the conditions that determine simultaneously
the labor market tightness µ, the set of productivity thresholds R(a) and
unemployment levels by ability, u(a), 8a 2 [a;a].9






























Proof. First, we make use of the fact that (r+¸)J(a;")¡(r+¸)J(a;R(a)) =
"¡R(a)¡w(a;")+w(a;R(a)). From J(a;R(a)) = 0 and the wage expression
(3), it follows (r+¸)J(a;") = (1¡°)[" ¡ R(a)]. Second, integrating by parts
we ¯nd also that
R 1
R(a) [" ¡ R(a)]dG(") =
R 1
R(a) [1 ¡ G(")]d"
Property 1. The labor market equilibrium is characterized by R0(a) < 0.






which implies that dR
da ´ R0(a) = ¡ 1
1¡(
¸¡°µq(µ)
r+¸ )[1¡G(R)] < 0 8¸;°.
According to this property, the higher the worker's ability, the lower the
productivity threshold below which the job is destroyed. This suggests there-
fore that high-ability workers may keep their jobs even though bad produc-
tivity shocks hit them.
3 Simulations of the equilibrium wage distri-
bution
An important implication of our model is that the distribution of wages de-
pends on the endogenous job destruction decision. In particular, the shape
9A discussion of wage distribution determination is provided in the next section.
10The non-directed search assumption implies that the labor market tightness depends
on the distribution of abilities among the unemployment pool, which itself depends on
tightness. Consequently, we cannot provide a formal statement of existence and unique-
ness.
9of wage dispersion can not be not the same as the one we assumed for the
distribution of workers' abilities due to these endogenous job destructions.
This section aims at enlightening the potential empirical relevance of endoge-
nous job destructions as a way to explain the distribution of wages. We brie°y
present the model calibration, discuss the computation of wage distribution
and then examine some numerical experiments.
3.1 Calibration
We consider a quarterly calibration of the model. A ¯rst set of parameters
is based on external information, while a second aims at replicating some
stylized facts characterizing the French low-skilled workers data set.
As a preliminary step, speci¯cations of functional forms for the matching
function and the distributions of idiosyncratic shocks and abilities are re-
quired. As it is usually assumed, we consider a uniform distribution of shocks
G(x) = x 8x 2 [0;1] and a Cobb-Douglas matching function M(v;u) =
vÃu1¡Ã. The dispersion of abilities is assumed to be de¯ned by a Pareto
distribution11 which satis¯es F(a) = 1 ¡ (1
a)¯ 8a 2 [1;a].
































The ¯rst set of parameters fr;¸;Ã;°g is actually taken from Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999). Values are reported in Table 1.12
Table 1: Parameters
r ¸ Ã ° a ¯ z c
0.01 0.1 0.5 0.5 2 1 1.5 0.044
11For instance, Mortensen D. (2003) makes this assumption to characterize heterogeneity
of productivities.
12Keep in mind that in our framework the Hosios condition ° = Ã no longer achieves
e±ciency due to externalities in the matching process.
10The second set of parameters includes fa;¯;z;cg. Therefore we choose
four targets: the unemployment rate of 8%, an average unemployment spell
of 5 quarters, the ratio of the mean wage over the median one, 1:04, and
the average job destruction rate for the 5th wage decile. In particular, this
calibration implies that home production is equal to 1.5 for all workers' types,
while market production goes from 1 to 2 for workers with the lowest ability
(a = 1) and from 2 to 3 for workers with the highest ability (a = 2).
3.2 Computation of wage distribution
To determine the distribution of wages, ¯rst keep in mind that, in our bench-
mark, the wage earning of a worker is not only related to her ability but also
to idiosyncratic shocks that hit the job. Formally, this results in w = w(a;").
On the other hand, without any shock, there are no endogenous job de-
structions. The distribution of wages could be then directly derive from
abilities'one as the wage expression would only depend on ability a. More
precisely, substituting ¸G(R(a)) with an exogenous job destruction rate s,
the density function of wages denoted Á(w) would be given by:






Therefore, from the Pareto distribution, we would get f(a) ´ F 0(a) =
¯a¡¯¡1, leading to f0(a) < 0. This would unambiguously imply Á0(w) < 0.
Such a strictly decreasing shape of the wage density function is obviously at
odds with empirical ¯ndings.
But considering idiosyncratic shocks ¯rst imply that heterogenous workers
may earn the same wage. To compute the density of wages, we then need
to account for the endogenous job destruction decision as well. For instance,
some high-ability workers may earn low wages at a certain point because
their productivity threshold is low. Beyond this intuitive statement, we can






ª(w;a) = 0 8w < w(a;R(a))
ª(w;a) = f(a) ¡ u(a) 8w ¸ w(a;R(a))
where we make use of the fact that the uniform distribution of shocks
implies that the density of each productivity draw is unchanged all across
the support of shocks.
113.3 Numerical experiments
This quantitative analysis aims at examining whether our model is able to
produce realistic properties concerning separation rates and wage dispersion.
Figure 3 shows the model properties. Figure 4 compares some statistics
calculated from the simulated data of the model with the same statistics
based upon empirical data for the French low-skilled workers segment. First
of all, the model implies a decreasing relationship between the job destruction
rate of the worker and her ability: it starts with a quarterly rate of 5% and
falls to zero for workers whose ability is 1.55 times higher than the lowest
one. Without further foundation for employment exit than idiosyncratic
shock, this implies that the unemployment risk is null for those workers.
Given the equilibrium distribution of abilities, around 20% of workers do not
experience any employment to unemployment transitions.
Figure 3: Model properties
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12The distribution of wages is then a combination of the exogenous distribu-
tion of abilities and the endogenous job destruction rates. First, the highest
wage is 1.6 times greater than the lowest while the highest ability is two
times greater than the lowest one. So, there is wage compression. But the
most striking feature is that the model is able to generate an hump-shaped
distribution. This shape is the outcome of both mechanisms related to en-
dogenous job destructions. On one hand, while the proportion of low-ability
workers among the employed is assumed to be high given the Pareto distri-
bution, it is actually reduced as those workers run higher separation rates.
On the other hand, workers with the highest (lowest) abilities move right
(left) in the wage distribution. In turn, a high-ability worker may earn a low
wage: despite a very bad productivity shock (which implies a low wage), a
¯rm may accept to not close down the job because of high expected gains in
the future, once the bad temporary shock over. It would not be the case if
the worker had a low level of ability.
Figure 4: Model assessment
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We then compare model implications with the statistics calculated from
the group of low-skilled workers in France. Figure 4 reports two kinds of
statistics: (i) the panel on the left gives the value of each wage decile with
respect to the median wage13 (ii) the panel on the right gives the average
job destruction rate according to the wage interval workers belong to, over
the one calculated for those in the 5th wage interval14. The model seems to
13Keep in mind that our model is calibrated so as to reproduce the value of the median
wage over the mean wage. By de¯nition, this statistic is equal to one for the 5th decile,
both in the data and the model.
14The 5th wage interval includes wages between the 4th and the 5th decile.
13be performing pretty well although we slightly understate the size of wage
dispersion, both on the right and on the left of the distribution. Another
interesting performance of the model concerns the average job destruction
rate: until the median wage the model allows for a very good ¯t of job
destruction rates. Indeed, the employment to unemployment transition rate
of workers in the ¯rst wage interval, over the one of workers belonging to
the 5th, is more than 2.5 times lower than the transition rate of workers
belonging to the 5th wage interval, as found in data. However, above, the
model implies that the job destruction rate decreases up to zero whereas it
should become stable.
Overall, although the performance of the model is obviously far from
perfect, we think that these numerical experiments highlight the potential
role of endogenous job destructions in the wage dispersion analysis. In this
way, our framework puts emphasis on a mechanism that can generate hump-
shaped wage distributions, as found in the data.
4 Conclusion
This paper mainly stressed the potential role of endogenous job destructions
in the wage dispersion discussion. We have developed a matching model
with endogenous job destructions in combination with heterogenous workers
to generate a negative correlation between the employment to unemployment
transition rate and the wage interval workers belong to. The point is that this
combination produces in addition new insights to understand the shape of the
wage distribution. This contrasts with the existing search-matching literature
which rather considers from now on-the-job search. We think therefore that
both on-the-job search and endogenous ¯ring decision should be considered
at the same time in order to provide a good description of wage inequalities.
Considering matching and non-directed search with heterogenous workers
which is known to raise (in)e±ciency issues, it is obvious that our work
also leaves open another research avenue dealing with optimal labor market
policy.
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16Appendix: The data set
To assess statistically the correlation between the employment to unemploy-
ment transition rates and wages, we used the French Labor Force survey
(Enqu^ ete Emploi) over the 1992-2002 period. This is a rotating panel since
exactly one-third of the sample is dropped from the sample each year and is
replaced with a new, comparable sample drawn from the current population.
The size of each Labor Force survey is about 135000 individuals who are
interviewed annually (in March) about their situation on the labor market.
It provides detailed characteristics on both individuals and jobs.
We de¯ned our sample in the following way. We focused on the population
of respondents who were working in March of year 1 and considered their sit-
uation on the labor market in March of the next year (year 2). We chose to
select the subsample of male workers aged from 18 and 60, working full-time
or part-time jobs and employed by the private sector. We exclude farmers
and self-employed. We also deleted the few observations with missing values,
mainly because of missing wages. These di®erent selections left us with a
sample including about 10600 observations each year. Lastly, workers were
sorted according to their socioeconomic status. More precisely, we de¯ned
four groups of workers by skill level: high-skilled workers (including execu-
tive, managers, professional people), medium-skilled workers, low-skilled and
unskilled workers15.
We focused on the two following variables of interest. The ¯rst one was
about transitions from employment to unemployment. Therefore, we de¯ned
a dummy variable which was equal to one when the worker has experienced
a transition from employment to unemployment between year 1 and year 2.
The second outcome was the monthly wage level, expressed in euros. Wages
were divided into ten intervals computed from nine wage deciles. For each
skill level, workers were then sorted according to the wage interval they be-
long to. We computed then annual employment-unemployment transition
rates both by skill level and wage interval. Finally, from the latter, we con-
structed a mean transition rate over the whole period, again both by skill
level and wage interval.
15According to the French categorization of the workforce (\CSP" - Cat¶ egorie-
socioprofessionelle), high-skilled workers refer to \Cadres", medium-skilled to \Professions
Interm¶ ediaires", low-skilled to \Ouvriers Quali¯¶ es" and unskilled workers to \Ouvriers
Non-Quali¯¶ es" or \Employ¶ es"
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